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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT OF GRAND JURY TO OPEN AND ExAMINE
PRIMARY BALLOT Boxs--[Missouri].-Suit was brought in State ex ret.
Dengel v. Hartman' to prohibit the respondent, judge of the Missouri Cir-
cuit Court, from issuing an order compelling the production of primary-
election ballot boxes for the purpose of a grand jury investigation. The
Supreme Court of Missouri, on appeal, refused to issue the writ of pro-
hibition, saying that by virtue of Article 8, See. 3 of the Missouri Consti-
tution,2 grand juries, in the course of investigation, are authorized to open
primary ballot boxes. This case is one of first impression.
The language of the constitutional provision is ambiguous. It reads in
part: "All elections by the people shall be by ballot.... All election officials
shall be sworn not to disclose how any voter shall have voted. Provided
that in cases of contested elections, grand jury investigations, and the trial
of all civil and criminal cases in which the violation of any law relating
to elections, including nominating elections, is under investigation, or at
issue, such officers may be required to testify, and the ballots cast may be
opened, examined, counted, compared with the list of voters, and received
as evidence."
The case of State ex rel. Holman v. McElhinney3 had held that the addi-
tion of the phrase "including nominating elections" to an exception to the
inviolacy of the secrecy of ballots, by implication extended the constitutional
guaranty of a secret ballot to primaries. The original construction of
Article 8, Sec. 3,4 prior to the addition of this clause, had been to the con-
trary.5 Thereupon the legislature extended the exceptions specifically to
primaries,6 and in 1924 the clause referred to was added to the constitu-
tional provision.7
The problem before the court in the principal case, obviously, was
whether the clause "including nominating elections" applied only to the
trial of civil or criminal cases, involving violations of election laws, or
whether it applied to cases of contested elections and grand jury investiga-
tions as well. The relator, urging the narrower, literal construction, cited
as authority Goldman v. Hiller8 and State ex rel. Dorsay v. Sprague.9 The
contrary result reached by the court accords with the distinct modern trend
in statutory construction of ambiguous legislation.
1. State ex rel. Dengel v. Hartman, 96 S. W. (2d) 329 (Mo., 1936).
2. Mo. Const., Art. 8, Sec. 3 (1924).
3. State ex rel. Holman v. McElhinney, 315 Mo. 731, 286 S. W. 951
(1926).
4. Art. 8, Sec. 3 prior to its amendment in 1924 declared all elections were
to be secret, and by ballot. Exceptions to this secrecy were allowed in grand
jury investigations.
5. State ex rel. Feinstein v. Hartman, 231 S. W. 982 (Mo., 1921) in
accordance with prior decisions held that the term elections as used in
Art. 8, Sec. 3 did not include primaries.
6. R. S. Mo. 1929, sec. 1716; R. S. Mo. 1919 sec. 5403.
7. Mo. Const., Art. 8, Sec. 3 (1924).
8. State ex rel. Goldman v. Hiller, 278 S. W. 708 (Mo., 1926).
9. State ex rel. Dorsay v. Sprague, 326 Mo. 654 (1930), 33 S. W. (2d) 102.
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The provision involved in the case at bar lies within that area of
ambiguity in which modern courts will give expression of the framers'
intent."o The court reaches a sound result in view of the growing im-
portance of primaries in the election process, and one which accords with
the framers' probable intent, since the term "election" of Art. 8, Sec. 3,
had, before 1924, been held not to include primaries, 1 and in view of the
legislative attempt at that time to rectify such interpretation by legislation
and by proposing the constitutional amendment.'2
W. A. H.
CONTRACTS-MUTUAL PROMISES AS CONSIDERATION FOR CHARITABLE SUB-
SCRIPTINS--[Federal.-In the recent case of Baker University v. Clelland,1
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stated by way of dictum that in Mis-
souri the subscription of one subscriber to a charitable institution does not
constitute consideration for the subscription of another.
This dictum was based on the decision of the St. Louis Court of Appeals
in the case of Methodist Orphans' Home Association v. Sharp.2 That case,
however, can be distinguished from cases involving the ordinary subscrip-
tion contract,3 in that there was no pretense of a contract, and the instru-
ment did not express or even imply that there was consideration. There is
a distinct difference between such an instrument and a subscription con-
tract for a donee beneficiary in which the expressed consideration is the
subscription of others. The dictum in the instant case might tend to be
misleading, as there has been no decision by the Missouri appellate courts
as to the validity or invalidity of such a subscription contract.
The modern tendency is to make subscriptions to charitable institutions
binding wherever that can be done without entirely overstepping estab-
lished rules requiring consideration.4 A number of states have held that
the mutual promises of subscribers are binding.6 The result is probably
based on public policy since most charitable institutions depend almost en-
10. State ex rel. Russel et al. v. Highway Commission, 328 Mo. 942, 25
S. W. (2d) 196 (1931); Lovins v. City of St. Louis, 336 Mo. 1194, 84 S. W.
(2d) 127 (1935).
11. Supra, note 5.
12. Supra, note 6.
1. Trustees of Baker University v. Clelland, 86 F. (2d) 14 (C. C. A. 8,
1936).
2. Methodist Orphans' Home Association v. Sharp, 6 Mo. App. 150
(1878).
3. Example of ordinary subscription contract: "Because of my interest
in the organization, and in consideration of the promises of others, I the
undersigned promise to pay - dollars."
4. 38 A. L. R. 869 (1925).
5. Brokaw v. McElroy, 162 Iowa 288, 143 N. W. 1087, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.)
835 (1913) ; Greenville Supply Co. v. Whitehurst, 202 N. C. 413, 163 S. E.
446 (1932) ; Catner College v. Hyland, 133 Kan. 322, 299 Pac. 607 (1931) ;
Petty v. Church of Christ, etc., 95 Ind. 278 (1884) ; Waters v. Union Trust
Co., 129 Mich. 640, 89 N. W. 687 (1902).
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